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This Article attempts to define hedge funds and to distinguish them from a variety of similar 
investment funds. After reviewing the hedge fund definition in the U.S. and the EU, this Article 
argues that the current regulatory framework, which defines hedge funds by reference to what 
they are not rather than to what they are, is prone to regulatory arbitrage. Even in the presence 
of a statutory definition, due to the ineluctable indeterminacy of language and regulatory 
arbitrage problems, borderline issues will persist, which makes statutory definitions of hedge 
funds neither possible nor desirable. Therefore, regulators should avoid the temptation of 
proposing such statutory definitions. Instead, they should rely on regulatory discretion within 
a broad principles-based regulatory framework to do so.  
For such a principles-based regulatory regime to work, regulators should rely on a functional 
definition of hedge funds. Accordingly, this Article defines hedge funds as privately organized 
investment vehicles with a specific fee structure, not widely available to the public, aimed at 
generating absolute returns irrespective of market movements (Alpha) through active trading 
and making use of a variety of trading strategies. This functional definition is likely to help 
address regulatory problems that might originate from statutory definitions of hedge funds.  
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I. Introduction 
Should you ask me to identify God or his nature, I shall cite 
Simonides as my authority: when the tyrant Hiero posed the same 
question to him, he asked for a day’s grace to consider it privately, 
and when Hiero put the same question to him next day, he begged 
two days’ grace. After doubling the number of days repeatedly, 
and being asked by Hiero why he did this, he answered: “The 
longer I ponder the question, the darker I think is the prospect of 
a solution.”1 
In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, the quest to bring the hedge fund industry under 
official oversight, scrutiny, and regulation, gained substantial momentum.2 In addition, a chain 
of hedge fund-related events, which allegedly contributed to the collapse of a Large Complex 
Financial Institution (LCFI),3 buttressed the argument for government regulatory intervention 
in the hedge fund industry.4 Yet, deep in the theoretical underpinnings of this interventionist 
approach rest several fundamental and open-ended questions. One of the overlooked aspects of 
                                                 
1 Cicero, The Nature of the Gods (Oxford University Press 1997) 23 
2 Even prior to the financial crisis there were considerable support for hedge fund regulation. For example, just one 
year before the financial market turmoil of the 2007, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
Chairman, Christopher Cox, asserted that “[h]edge funds are not, should not be, and will not be unregulated”. See 
Cox Christopher, Testimony Concerning the Regulation of Hedge Funds: Before the U.S. Senate Committee on 
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs (2006) 
In the EU, prior to the global financial crisis, the hedge fund industry was not regulated at the EU level. Instead, 
hedge funds were subject to regulations of the competent authorities of the Member States at the national level. See 
Phoebus Athanassiou, Hedge Fund Regulation in the European Union: Current Trends and Future Prospects 
(Kluwer Law International 2009). See also Commissions International Organization of Securities, The Regulatory 
Environment for Hedge Funds, A Survey and Comparison, Final Report, 2006). 
However, even at that time, there were concerns about hedge funds’ role in financial markets and especially in the 
corporate governance of non-financial companies. Perceived as the legacy of the American laissez-faire capitalism, 
hedge funds attracted considerable animosity from politicians of continental Europe. Calling for their abolition, 
hedge funds were demonized as being ‘crazy’ and ‘hellish’ which “fall like a plague of locusts” over the companies, 
“devour everything, then fly on to the next one”. (A statement quoted from Franz Müntefering, Germany’s deputy 
chancellor) See Sebastian Mallaby, 'Hands off hedge funds' (2007) 86 Foreign Affairs 91 92. Not to fall behind in 
the race to demonization of hedge funds, others called hedge funds along with private equity firms “‘aggressive’ 
gangs of ‘speculators’, bent on “snapping up firms, sacking workers and creaming off profits”. See , Battle of the 
Big Beasts: Mutual Suspicions and National Interests Underlie European Rows over Financial Regulation  (2009) 
3 This happened in 2007 when Bear Stearns and Goldman Sachs injected capital to their ailing hedge funds. Although 
it is argued that a banking entity has nothing to gain from a below-market transfer of credit to a troubled affiliate, 
(Daniel R. Fischel, Andrew M. Rosenfield and Robert S. Stillman, 'The Regulation of Banks and Bank Holding 
Companies' (1987) 73 Virginia Law Review 301 326), the bailouts of hedge funds by their parent companies 
(banking entities) in the recent financial crisis proved otherwise. For example, the Bear Stearns, Goldman Sachs, 
and Citigroup bailed out their internal hedge funds just before their collapse. It is generally believed that these 
bailouts contributed to the collapse of Bear Stearns, a systemically important financial institution. See Darrell Duffie, 
'The Failure Mechanics of Dealer Banks' (2010) 24 The Journal of Economic Perspectives 51 59. See also Michael 
R. King and Philip Maier, 'Hedge Funds and Financial Stability: Regulating Prime Brokers Will Mitigate Systemic 
Risks' (2009) 5 Journal of Financial Stability 283 291. 
4 For example, in the run-up to the recent financial crisis, the collapse of two Bear Stearns’ hedge funds in the spring 
of 2007 imposed substantial losses on the parent company, itself a systemically important investment bank.  In that 
case, the collapse of hedge funds did not impose a substantial credit risk on Bear Stearns. However, Bear Stearns 
bailed them out due to reputational concerns that the failure of such entities could raise concerns about the safety 
and soundness of the firm itself. Such a bailout highlighted the concerns about the indirect subsidization of hedge 
funds by taxpayers through the parent organization’s access to the Federal Reserve discount window and implicit 
guarantee of a bailout of a too-big-to-fail parent company. Such an opportunity for excessive risk taking means that 
hedge fund managers do not bear the entire costs and consequences of their risk taking, implying that regulatory 
measures are needed to internalize those externalities. See Dixon Lloyd, Noreen Clancy and Krishna B. Kumar, 
Hedge Funds and Systemic Risk (RAND Corporation 2012) 43 
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hedge funds, which furtively slipped under the regulatory radar, was the definitional challenge 
lying at the heart of the hedge fund regulation debate.  
‘Private funds’, ‘alternative investment funds’, ‘hedge funds’, and a panoply of more 
designations in different languages represent the nomenclature used to refer to a type of 
investment fund having idiosyncratic attributes that distinguishes it from mainstream 
investment funds. Although the term ‘hedge fund’ was coined by Carol J. Loomis in an article 
of 1966, which discussed the structure and investment strategies of the investment vehicle 
originally created in 1949 by Alfred W. Jones,5 thus far, there is no clear understanding of the 
term. Indeed, questions about the definition of hedge funds can confuse even the savviest and 
most discerning veterans of the hedge fund industry, let alone laymen and the uninitiated. 
Hedge funds have been and will continue to be a murky phenomenon, not least due to the 
dynamic nature of their business, the complexity of their legal structure, the vast variety of 
investment strategies at their disposal, and the lower levels of public disclosure required of 
them. The nebula surrounding the hedge fund industry, which is also partly rooted in 
definitional problems, poses major challenges for the regulatory strategies intended to address 
the problems that allegedly contributed to the global financial crisis. The most conspicuous of 
these challenges is regulatory arbitrage, whose basic raison d’être is to sever the link between 
the economic substance of an activity and its legal treatment.6 
The definitional challenges in regulating hedge funds are neither academic, ivory-tower 
fantasies, nor inconsequential, linguistic hair-splitting. Indeed, the relatively short history of 
hedge fund regulation has already witnessed cases whose outcomes were, at least partially, 
dependent on the definition of the term ‘hedge fund’.7 The definitional problems, which often 
lead to boundary problems8 and questions of the applicability of specific rules and regulations, 
are so deeply ingrained in the hedge fund-regulation debate that legislators and regulators 
simply sweep the definitional issues under the rug to avoid having to define hedge funds.9 
                                                 
5 Carol J. Loomis, 'The Jones nobody keeps up with' (1966) 4 Fortune Magazine  
6 Victor Fleischer, 'Regulatory arbitrage' (2010) 89 Texas Law Review 227 229 
7 See Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
8 The boundary problem denotes a situation in which there is a substitution flow of financial activities towards less-
regulated activities when the costs of ‘effective regulations’ make the regulated activities costlier and hence less 
profitable. See Charles Goodhart, 'The Boundary Problem in Financial Regulation' (2008) 206 National Institute 
Economic Review 48. See also Charles A. E. Goodhart and Rosa M. Lastra, 'Border Problems' (2010) 13 Journal of 
International Economic Law 705 
9 However, for the purposes of the Form PF, the SEC recently defined hedge funds in terms of their performance 
fee, high leverage, and short selling. See Commission Commodity Futures Trading, Securities and Commission 
Exchange, 'Reporting by Investment Advisers to Private Funds and Certain Commodity Pool Operators and 
Commodity Trading Advisors on Form PF' (2011)  22 
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Since the complexity and dynamics of financial institutions do not lend themselves to a per 
genus et differentiam definition, 10  the search for an all-encompassing definition that  is 
adequately inclusive and sufficiently exclusive of each and every aspect of hedge funds seems 
to be a futile endeavor.11 However precise a definition of hedge funds may be, ineluctable 
borderline issues will always remain.12 Therefore, it is not surprising that a consistent pattern 
of avoidance – that is, a refusal to engaging in definitional issues in hedge fund regulation – 
can be observed among regulators. Against this backdrop, the purpose of this Article is to 
provide a working definition of hedge funds by which regulators can distinguish hedge funds 
from other similar investment funds within a principles-based regulation framework, that is, an 
approach to regulation that is focused on ‘goals’ and ‘outcomes’ rather than the ‘means’ used 
to achieve those goals.13 
This Article first reviews the definition of hedge funds in the two largest hedge fund-regulatory 
jurisdictions (i.e., the U.S. and the EU). Second, it highlights the potential problems that might 
arise from statutory definitions of hedge funds and argues why such definitions can be 
counterproductive and are likely to give rise to regulatory arbitrage. Third, this Article focuses 
on the public-policy responses to regulatory arbitrage stemming from definitional problems and 
proposes that, to counter regulatory arbitrage by hedge funds, any definition of hedge funds 
should reflect the realities of the dynamic and vibrant hedge fund industry. To achieve that 
objective, this Article advocates a principles-based regulatory framework, within which 
regulators are afforded sufficient power to designate an investment fund as a ‘hedge fund’ if 
they find that certain functional criteria are met thereby, even though the entity itself uses 
different self-designating labels. At the end, this Article presents a functional definition of 
hedge funds, based not only on their organizational structure, but also on the sui generis role 
they play in financial markets. The article also expands on this definition by focusing on 
specific functions of hedge funds and the features that mark them as special in financial market. 
                                                 
10 This is an Aristotelian pattern of definitions in which definitions are provided by determining their genus to which 
that term belongs and then providing the difference which gives the species and locates the term within that genus. 
The most famous example is humans are rational animals.  
11 Since definitions define boundaries between financial institutions imperfectly, it is argued that the future of 
securities regulation is likely to be about the resolution of the boundary questions. See Joel Seligman, 'The 
Obsolescence of Wall Street: A Contextual Approach to the Evolving Structure of Federal Securities Regulation' 
(1995) 93 Michigan law review 649 651. Although that statement is made in the context of U.S. Federal securities 
laws and their relationship with state securities laws (blue-sky laws), and boundaries between those laws, such a 
statement equally holds in the debate about hedge fund regulation.  
12 See H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law, vol 2 (Oxford University Press 1994) 13. It is also argued that the laws 
resting upon definitions and criteria involving clear rules and thresholds are prone to legal engineering and regulatory 
arbitrage. See Doreen McBarnet, 'Financial Engineering or Legal Engineering? Legal Work, Legal Integrity and the 
Banking Crisis' in Iain G. MacNeil and Justin O'Brien (eds), The Future of Financial Regulation (The Future of 
Financial Regulation, Hart Publishing 2010) 72 
13 Authority Financial Services, Principles-based regulation: Focusing on the outcomes that matter, 2007) See also 
Julia Black, Martyn Hopper and Christa Band, 'Making a success of Principles-based regulation' (2007) 1 Law and 
financial markets review 191 192 
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Such a focus may well help regulators to better understand and identify the hedge fund business 
and eventually prevent hedge funds from engaging in regulatory arbitrage. 
II. The Statutory definitions of hedge funds in the U.S. and the 
EU 
Given that both the U.S. and the EU defined hedge funds by reference to what they are not 
rather than by reference to what they are, to investigate their definitions of hedge funds, the 
focus should not be on the hedge fund entity itself; rather, special attention must be paid to 
other, relatively well-known and defined financial institutions. Only by first studying non-
hedge-fund financial institutions and investment funds, and then engaging in a process of 
elimination, is it feasible to understand what hedge funds are. Due to the fact that such a 
definition of hedge funds is embedded in a complex web of financial regulations in the U.S., 
doing so requires going through a maze of financial regulations. In other words, a negative 
definition of hedge funds implies that, in order to define and understand hedge funds, a survey 
of the existing regulations that, by design, exclude hedge funds is required. In short, 
understanding what hedge funds are not calls for an overview of the hedge fund regulatory 
framework that existed prior to the Dodd-Frank Act. The following section studies the four 
main U.S. legislative Acts that relate to hedge funds: the Investment Company Act of 1940, the 
Investment Advisers Act of 1940, the Securities Act of 1933, and the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934, before discussing the Dodd-Frank Act. The Article immediately thereafter clarifies the 
definition of hedge funds set forth in the EU’s Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive 
(AIFMD).  
1. The U.S. hedge fund definition 
Prior to the regulatory reforms adopted in the wake of the global financial crisis, the U.S. had 
no statutory definition of hedge funds.14 This regulatory lacuna gave rise to a peculiar, negative 
definition of hedge funds; essentially, hedge funds became the product of statutory and 
regulatory carve-outs that were negatively defined by reference to what they were not, rather 
                                                 
14 However, the U.S. Private Fund Investment Advisers Registration Act of 2010 (the Private Fund Act) introduces 
the concept of ‘private fund’ a subcategory of which can be a hedge fund. In fact, the Private Fund Act follows the 
path of its predecessors and defines hedge funds by reference to what they are not, rather than to what they are. 12 
U.S.C. § 1851 (h)(2). However, the Private Fund Act and the EU Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive’s 
(AIFMD) definitions are criticized for failing to create a clear distinction between hedge funds and other similar 
funds such as private equity funds. See Jennifer Payne, 'Private Equity and Its Regulation in Europe' (2011) 12 
European Business Organization Law Review 559 584 
See also Jacob Rothschild, 'Europe is Getting It Wrong on Financial 
Reform                                                                                                                         ' Financial Times 
(<http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/f51bdb9a-4caa-11df-9977-00144feab49a.html#axzz2JvN8jQ2M> accessed April 20 
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than to what they were.15 To be more precise, prior to the Dodd-Frank Act, U.S. financial 
regulation purposefully ‘designed out’ certain entities from regulatory oversight by the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). In other words, prior to the U.S.’s 2010 financial-
regulatory overhaul, hedge funds were – by design – exempt from the majority of the 
regulations normally applicable to investment companies.16 
The regulatory failure to define hedge funds by no means suggests that there had not been 
attempts to provide a legal definition of hedged funds. Given the case law’s constant exposure 
to the ever-changing world of finance, U.S. courts developed a jurisprudential definition of 
hedge funds. In Goldstein v. SEC., the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia stated: 
‘Hedge funds’ are notoriously difficult to define. The term appears nowhere in the 
federal securities laws, and even industry participants do not agree upon a single 
definition. The term is commonly used as a catch-all for ‘any pooled investment 
vehicle that is privately organized, administered by professional investment 
managers, and not widely available to the public’.17 
As even those with very little exposure to, or experience with, the hedge fund industry can see, 
the court’s definition is far from satisfactory. The following subsections present an overview 
of the U.S.’s regulatory attempt to define hedge funds, both before and after the Dodd-Frank 
Act, including an overview of the above mentioned Acts, to help clarify the U.S.’s definition 
of hedge funds. 
1.1. The Investment Company Act of 1940  
The Investment Company Act of 1940 regulates publicly owned companies that invest in 
securities (i.e., investment companies), in contrast to industrial companies that engage in 
manufacturing goods or providing services. This Act mostly regulates mutual funds and their 
managers, directors, and advisers. As with other regulations in financial markets, this Act first 
requires investment companies to register with the SEC. Further, it imposes certain 
requirements on their capital structure and their transactions with insiders and institutes certain 
restrictions on the types of transactions such registered investment companies can enter into.  
                                                 
15 Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873, 884 (D.C. Cir. 2006). See also Gordon De Brouwer, Hedge Funds in Emerging 
Markets (Cambridge University Press 2001) 10  
16 Nevertheless, hedge funds were not totally exempt from those regulations. As this article will demonstrate, there 
was a whole host of other applicable rules and regulations such as Securities Exchange Act’s anti-fraud liability 
under §10(b) and the well-known SEC’s rule 10b-5. 
17 A statement by Judge Randolph, Circuit Judge, in Goldstein v. SEC. See Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873, 884 
(D.C. Cir. 2006). 
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Normally, because hedge funds are investment companies as defined by the Investment 
Company Act,18 they would fall under the Act’s ambit. Nevertheless, the Act establishes two 
exemptions from its provisions. First, section 3(c)(1) of the Investment Company Act exempts 
investment companies that have no more than one hundred investors; and second, section 
3(c)(7) of the National Securities Markets Improvement Act (NSMIA) exempts such 
investment companies composed of an unlimited number of qualified purchasers. Provided that 
an investment company complies with the requirements of either of the two exemptions, they 
are relieved of the obligation to register with the SEC. 
Section 3(c)(1)19 provides that “any issuer whose outstanding securities (other than short-term 
paper) are beneficially owned by not more than one hundred persons and which is not making 
and does not presently propose to make a public offering of its securities” is not deemed to be 
an ‘investment company’.20 In other words, a fund or an issuer having fewer than one hundred 
investors that raises capital through private placement is not considered an investment company 
for the purposes of the Investment Company Act and, accordingly, is exempt from the 
registration requirement.  
In a 1996 no-action letter, 21 the SEC agreed that “each Fund may be considered a single 
beneficial owner of a 3(c)(1) Entity, provided that:  
1. no Fund will invest in any 3(c)(1) Entity to the extent that the attribution provisions of 
section 3(c)(1)(A) are triggered; and  
2. no Fund or 3(c)(1) Entity will be structured or operated for the purpose of 
circumventing the provisions of the Act.”22 
Therefore, in accordance with the above-cited provisions and the SEC’s no-action letter, 
beneficial ownership by a ‘company’ was considered to be beneficial ownership of one person, 
such that section 3(c)(1) issuers could have fewer than one hundred funds as their investors, 
                                                 
18 According to the Investment Company Act an ‘investment company’ means “any issuer which-- 
(A) is or holds itself out as being engaged primarily, or proposes to engage primarily, in the business of investing, 
reinvesting, or trading in securities; (B) is engaged or proposes to engage in the business of issuing face-amount 
certificates of the installment type, or has been engaged in such business and has any such certificate outstanding; 
or (C) is engaged or proposes to engage in the business of investing, reinvesting, owning, holding, or trading in 
securities, and owns or proposes to acquire investment securities having a value exceeding 40 per centum of the 
value of such issuer’s total assets (exclusive of Government securities and cash items) on an unconsolidated basis.” 
15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(a)(1). 
19 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(1).  
20 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(1)(A). 
21 Facing uncertainty with respect to whether a particular product, service, or action would constitute a violation of 
the federal securities law, an individual or entity may request a ‘no-action’ letter from the SEC staff. A no-action 
letter is the SEC’s staff position letter stating that if certain conditions are met, the staff will recommend no 
enforcement action be taken by the SEC against the requester based on the representations in the request. The no 
action letters only represent the opinion of the SEC’s staff and not those of the SEC’s commissioners. See Stephen 
J. Choi and A. C. Pritchard, Securities Regulation: Cases and Analysis, vol 2 (Thompson/Foundation Press 2008) 
41 
22 Cornish & Carey Commercial, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter (pub. avail. June 21, 1996). 
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provided that the ownership of the shares by any one of those companies or persons does not 
exceed 10 percent of the outstanding voting securities of the issuer. 
In a 1994 no-action letter,23 the SEC announced that if the employee participants of a defined-
contribution plan involved in investment decision making, that plan could not be counted as a 
single investor. Therefore, if participants in such a contribution plan have an active role in the 
management of the plan, each participant would be counted towards the 100-investor limit. 
Later, on October 11, 1996, the National Securities Markets Improvement Act (NSMIA) 
became law. That Act amended, inter alia, the Investment Company Act and the Investment 
Advisers Act of 1940. Its significance lies in its amendments, which are of particular relevance 
to hedge funds and their ability to raise funds from an unlimited number of qualified purchasers. 
Section 3(c)(7) of the NSMIA (codified as section 3(c)(7) of the 1934 Act, as amended) states 
that hedge funds can offer their securities to an unlimited number of ‘qualified purchasers’.24 
In other words, this Act created new categories of hedge funds that could be sold to an unlimited 
number of ‘qualified purchasers’. Nonetheless, section 12(g) of the Securities Exchange Act of 
193425 continued to set a limit on the number of hedge funds’ qualified investors. According to 
that Act, if a fund has 500 or more investors, qualified or not, the registration and reporting 
requirements of the Securities Exchange Act apply. Thus, to be exempt from Securities 
Exchange Act regulations, hedge funds needed to limit the number of their investors to 499.26 
Pursuant to the enactment of the NSMIA, two types of hedge funds emerged, ‘Section 3(c)(1) 
funds’ and ‘Section 3(c)(7) funds’. Basically, subject to certain requirements, the NSMIA 
allowed funds that relied on the definitional exception of the Investment Company Act section 
3(c)(1) (‘Section 3(c)(1) funds’) (i.e., privately held investment companies with 100 or fewer 
beneficial owners), to convert into ‘Section 3(c)(7) funds’ (i.e., privately held investment 
companies owned solely by qualified purchasers). As long as a hedge fund falls within either 
of these two exemptions, it will not be considered an investment company for the purposes of 
the Investment Company Act and its strict provisions would not apply. 
                                                 
23 PannAgora Group Trust, SEC No-Action Letter, (pub. avail. Apr. 29, 1994). 
24 A ‘Qualified purchaser’ means (i) any natural person who owns not less than $5 million in investments; (ii) any 
company that owns not less than $5 million in investments and that is owned directly or indirectly by close family 
members; (iii) any trust, which is not formed for investment purposes, with no less than $5 million in investment; or 
(iv) any investment manager or company, which owns and invests not less than $25 million in investments. See 15 
U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(51)(A). 
25 15 U.S.C. § 78(1)(g). 
26 François-Serge Lhabitant, Handbook of Hedge Funds (John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 2006) 55 
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1.2. Investment Advisers Act of 1940 
According to the Investment Advisers Act,27 an ‘investment adviser’ means “any person who, 
for compensation, engages in the business of advising others, either directly or through 
publications or writings, as to the value of securities or as to the advisability of investing in, 
purchasing, or selling securities, or who, for compensation and as part of a regular business, 
issues or promulgates analyses or reports concerning securities”.28 The Act requires registration 
with the SEC and establishes disclosure obligations, restrictions on fee arrangement structures 
and other obligations with regard to maintaining books and records for those advisers falling 
under its regulatory purview.  
Hedge fund advisers clearly fall within that definition, which implies that they should be 
obliged to register with the SEC and comply with its regulations. Nevertheless, hedge funds 
could avoid that obligation by taking advantage of the Act’s section 203(b) de minimis 
exception. Section 203(b)(3)29 of the Investment Advisers Act states that an investment adviser 
having fewer than 15 clients during the course of preceding 12 months, “who neither holds 
himself out generally to the public as an investment adviser nor acts as an investment adviser 
to any investment company” need not register with the SEC.30 Moreover, a hedge fund adviser 
can take advantage of the Investment Advisers Act’s safe harbor, which provides that a legal 
entity, such as a hedge fund, is to be counted as a single client. Therefore, if a hedge fund 
adviser advises fewer than fifteen individual funds over the course of a rolling twelve-month 
period, that adviser would have been be exempt from registration. Accordingly, the de minimis 
exception and the SEC’s interpretation of the word ‘client,’ which included legal entities such 
as hedge funds, each hedge fund adviser could have 14 funds as clients. It is worth remembering 
that each of those hedge fund clients, in turn, could have up to 499 individual investors.31  
In 2004, the SEC, concerned about hedge fund secrecy and fraudulent practices, as well the 
need to rein in hedge fund advisers and protect unsophisticated investors who had indirectly 
invested in hedge funds through pension funds and other financial institutions, issued a new 
rule (commonly known as ‘the Hedge Fund Rule’).32 Basically, in this rule making, the SEC 
announced that the term ‘client’ includes ‘investors’, and in the assessment of the number of 
clients an adviser had, all investors in the investing fund, including individual investors, must 
be counted. Thus, for the next two years, the SEC required hedge fund investment advisers with 
                                                 
27 15 U.S.C. § 80b-1(21). 
28 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11). 
29 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(b)(3). 
30 See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(b)(3). 
31 Thus hedge fund clients can potentially grow up to 6,986 individuals. See Wulf A. Kaal, 'Hedge Fund Regulation 
via Basel III' (2011) 44 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 389 414 
32 Securities United States and Commission Exchange, Registration under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund 
Advisers (2004) 
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more than 15 clients (regardless of whether they were individuals or legal entities) to register 
with it under the Investment Company Act. Nevertheless, in 2006, the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the District of Columbia in Goldstein v. SEC33 found the rule arbitrary and vacated it. 
Ultimately, new legislation, in the form of the Private Fund Investment Advisers Registration 
Act (hereinafter, the Private Fund Act),34 eliminated the 15-client exemption.35 
1.3. Securities Act of 1933 
Financial services and products, particularly securities, are deemed to be credence goods.36 The 
information asymmetry in credence goods is wider than all other types of information-sensitive 
goods and services. Historically, information sensitivity and the existence of such a huge 
information asymmetry between issuers and investors have frequently caused market failures 
in securities markets and, hence, frequent disruptions in market liquidity. In response to market 
disruptions and with a view toward minimizing asymmetric information between issuers and 
investors in publicly traded companies in primary market transactions, the US enacted the 
Securities Act of 1933, which imposes registration and disclosure obligations on the issuers of 
regulated securities. The Act’s main objective is to ensure informed investment decisions by 
investors, by requiring issuers to disclose all relevant information concerning the value of the 
securities to be issued, thereby preventing fraud in the primary markets. 
Since interests in hedge funds are deemed ‘securities’ for purposes of the Securities Act of 
193337 as interpreted by the courts, including the definition and meaning of a ‘security’ (i.e., 
                                                 
33 Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873, 884 (D.C. Cir. 2006). The court basically argued that the regulatory obligations 
of the advisers are owed to the funds rather than to the clients of the funds. Such a decision is criticized on the ground 
that the primary focus of regulation should be on the intermediated investors- those who put their investment in the 
fund- rather than on the funds themselves. Such an approach proposes that the advisers to private funds should owe 
their regulatory obligations to both the funds and the investors in the funds. See Anita K. Krug, 'Institutionalization, 
Investment Adviser Regulation, and the Hedge Fund Problem' (2011) 63 Hastings Law Journal 1 1 
34 The Private Fund Act is the Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act, which involves the “Regulation of Advisers to Hedge 
Funds and Others” the short title of which is the “Private Fund Investment Advisers Registration Act of 2010” (the 
Private Fund Act). The primary purpose of this title is to change the investment adviser registration and exemption 
regime under the Advisers Act of 1940 and impose registration and reporting requirement on hedge funds and private 
equity funds. 
35 This decision of the court is practically repealed by the Dodd-Frank Act. 
36 In economic theory, with respect to informational imperfections, product and services are categorized into three 
broad groups. ‘Search goods’, the quality of which can be inspected upon purchase; ‘Experience goods’ the quality 
of which can only be assessed after the purchase and the use of those goods (or services); and ‘Credence goods’ the 
quality of which cannot be assessed even after purchase and use, or whose quality might not be assessable at all. See 
Philip Nelson, 'Information and Consumer Behavior' (1970) 78 Journal of Political Economy 311  
Market forces cannot effectively discipline the suppliers of the credence goods, and there is a significant likelihood 
of the market failure resulting in the ‘lemons problem’. See George A. Akerlof, 'The Market for “Lemons”: Quality 
Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism' (1970) 84 The Quarterly Journal of Economics 488 
Most of the financial products and services are considered credence goods whose quality is not ascertainable even 
after the purchase. See Alessio M. Pacces and Heremans Dirk, 'Regulation of Banking and Financial Markets”' in 
Alessio M. Pacces and R. J. Van den Bergh (eds), Forthcoming in ‘Regulation and Economics’ in Encyclopedia of 
Law and Economics, vol 2 (Forthcoming in ‘Regulation and Economics’ in Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, 
Elgar 2011) 9. See also Alessio Pacces, 'Financial Intermediation in the Securities Markets: Law and Economics of 
Conduct of Business Regulation' (2000) 20 International Review of Law and Economics 479 
37 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1). 
 12 
the Howey test), 38 no public solicitation of such securities is allowed unless the issuer is 
registered with the SEC and complies with all of the 1933 Act’s reporting and other 
requirements. Hedge funds, like any other investment fund, might fall within the scope of the 
Securities Act of 1933 if they offer investment opportunities to investors in an initial offering, 
unless they qualify for one of the exemptions set out in the Act. 
The 1933 Act furnished a private-offering exemption in its section 4(2).39 If an issuer met the 
requirements of a private offering, it did not need to comply with the requirements of the Act 
with regard to information disclosure. Alternatively, an issuer could rely on the safe harbor 
provided by Rule 506 of Regulation D.40 This rule allowed securities to be privately offered “to 
a maximum of 35 sophisticated purchasers and an unlimited number of ‘accredited investors’ 
as defined by Rule 501(a) of the 1933 Act.”41  
1.4. Securities Exchange Act of 1934  
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, regulates secondary market transactions and 
all institutions participating in such transactions, including market professionals and 
institutions. This Act was intended to enhance the efficiency of trading through national 
securities markets. It also protects investors primarily through disclosure obligations. It 
requires, inter alia, brokers, national securities exchanges, and municipal securities dealers to 
register with the SEC and comply with its extensive regulations. It further requires continuous 
disclosure through periodic reporting requirements (i.e., quarterly and annual reporting by 
publicly traded companies) commonly known as ‘Exchange Act reporting issuers’. This Act 
only regulates post-distribution or secondary market trading such as tender offers, insider 
trading, and proxy solicitations. Registered investment funds under this Act are subject to:  
1. Periodic disclosure requirements under §1342 and §13(d), §13(g), and §13(f); 
2. Proxy rules under §14;43  
3. Insider reporting requirements; and 
4. Short-swing profits transaction rules under §16.44 
In addition to the above-mentioned requirements, this Act imposes the most important and the 
most inclusive anti-fraud liability under its §10(b), which is supported by the SEC’s well-
                                                 
38 SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 301 (1946). 
39 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2). 
40 Regulation D, 17 C.F.R. 230.506. 
41 17 C.F.R. 230.501. 
42 15 U.S.C. § 78m. 
43 15 U.S.C. § 78n. 
44 15 U.S.C. § 78p. 
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known Rule 10b-5. The Securities Exchange Act also contains anti-manipulation provisions 
and rules regulating proxy solicitation and certain relevant disclosures. 
The Securities Exchange Act generally applies to brokers and dealers and since most hedge 
funds were considered traders rather than dealers, 45  this Act’s section 15b registration 
requirement did not apply to them. However, if a hedge fund took on dealer functions,46 it 
should have been registered under this Act.47 Since most hedge funds do not issue securities to 
be listed on a securities exchange, they do not fall under the scope of the Securities Exchange 
Act and within its definition of ‘dealer in securities’.  
In addition, section 12(g) of the Securities Exchange Act required an issuer having 500 or more 
total investors and assets in excess of one million dollars to register with the SEC. However, 
hedge funds limited the number of their total investors to 499, thereby avoiding such 
registration and reporting requirements. Nevertheless, the antifraud provisions of the Securities 
Exchange Act (§10b)48 and SEC’s Rule 10b-5 apply to all investment companies regardless of 
whether or not it is registered. 
1.5. Dodd-Frank Act and elimination of the private adviser exemption 
Section 402 of the Private Fund Act, characterizes hedge funds as ‘private funds’ under the 
Investment Advisers Act, which regulates investment advisers who advise and manage 
investment funds in the U.S. In addition to imposing registration and reporting requirements, 
the Act imposes substantive regulatory requirements on investment advisers. Under the 
previous regime, which was repealed by the Private Fund Act, the Investment Advisers Act 
excluded certain investment advisers from the application of its requirements;49 Under that 
regime, hedge fund advisers were exempt from registration as long as they advised no more 
than 15 clients (‘the Private Adviser Exemption’). Section 203(b)(3) of the Investment Advisers 
Act, which was amended by the Dodd-Frank Act, no longer exempts advisers with such 
qualifications. 
                                                 
45 Securities United States and Commission Exchange, Implications of the Growth of Hedge Funds: Staff Report to 
the United States Securities and Exchange Commission, 2003) 14. Title 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(5)(A) defines a dealer 
as “any person engaged in the business of buying and selling securities (not including security-based swaps, other 
than security-based swaps with or for persons that are not eligible contract participants) for such person’s own 
account through a broker or otherwise.” 
46 Mehrling argues that although Long Term Capital Management (LTCM) was legally a hedge fund, it effectively 
engaged in dealer functions. See Perry Mehrling, 'Minsky and Modern Finance: The Case of Long Term Capital 
Management' (2000) 26 The Journal of Portfolio Management 81 
47 Indeed, some hedge funds opted to register as dealers under the Exchange Act. See United States and Exchange, 
Implications of the Growth of Hedge Funds: Staff Report to the United States Securities and Exchange Commission 
48 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b). 
49 However, it is maintained that these exclusions do not mean that antifraud liability and certain other provisions 
do not apply to hedge funds. 
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The Investment Company Act of 1940 defines a ‘private fund’ to be an issuer that would be an 
investment company, as defined in its section 3 of the Investment Company Act50 unless the 
issuer could avail itself of an exemption under sections 3(c)(1) or 3(c)(7) thereof. Section 
3(c)(1) is only available to a fund that does not publicly offer its securities and has no more 
than 100 beneficial owners of its outstanding securities, while section 3(c)(7) is only available 
to a fund that does not publicly offer its securities and limits its owners to qualified purchasers. 
The Private Fund Act only requires managers acting solely as an adviser to private funds with 
$150 million or more in assets under management (AUM) 51  to register with the SEC. 52 
Therefore, for the managers whose AUM exceeds the $150 million threshold, For those 
managers, the Act abolishes the private investment adviser exemption found in the Investment 
Advisers Act as interpreted by the Goldstein v. SEC decision. 53  An adviser, who is not 
registered with the SEC, is required, however, to register with the State in which it has the 
principal office if the State’s law so requires. In short, under the new rules, unless private fund 
advisers have at least $150 million in AUM, they are not required to register with and report to 
the SEC.54  
The Volcker Rule uses the Private Fund Act’s definition of a hedge fund. Under the Volcker 
Rule, a hedge fund or private equity fund is an issuer that would be an investment company, as 
defined in the Investment Company Act of 1940,55 but for section 3(c)(1) or 3(c)(7) of that Act, 
or such similar funds as the appropriate federal banking agencies, the SEC, and the Commodity 
Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) may determine.56 Therefore, hedge funds and private 
equity funds are defined to include any issuer that relies on the exemptions of the definition of 
investment company under sections 3(c)(1) or 3(c)(7) of the Investment Company Act. 57 
According to the Investment Company Act “an issuer that is not making and does not presently 
propose to make a public offering of its securities and either (i) has outstanding securities that 
are beneficially owned by not more than one hundred persons or (ii) has outstanding securities 
that are owned exclusively by qualified purchasers” is excluded from the definition of 
‘investment company’.58 The definitional exclusions set out in the Investment Company Act, 
as amended, are used by hedge funds and a large number and variety of other legal entities. 
These other entities include special purpose acquisition vehicles, certain ERISA-qualified 
                                                 
50 15 U.S.C. 80a-3. 
51 The total market value of the assets managed by an investment company on behalf of its investor is called AUM. 
52 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(m)(1). 
53 Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
54 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(m)(1). 
55 15 U.S.C. 80a-1 et seq. 
56 12 U.S.C. § 1851(h)(2). 
57 Financial Stability Oversight Council, Study & Recommendations on Prohibitions on Proprietary Trading & 
Certain Relationships with Hedge Funds and Private Equity Funds (2011) 57 
58 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c). 
 15 
employee pension funds, controlled subsidiaries, and certain joint ventures and, perhaps, 
venture capital funds.59 Thus, the question once again arises; what is a hedge fund and how 
should they be distinguished from these entities? 
There are major problems with the definitions of a hedge fund and private equity fund set out 
in the Investment Company Act, as amended by the Private Fund Act, and the Volcker 
Rule. The first and foremost is that these definitions are both over- and under-inclusive: the 
Volcker Rule’s prohibitions might include funds that were not intended to be regulated 
thereunder. In other words, not all investment funds traditionally considered to be hedge funds 
or private equity funds rely on the exemptions of sections 3(c)(1) or 3(c)(7) of the Investment 
Company Act. While it is possible to create an investment fund that relies on other exemptions 
provided by the Investment Company Act and do not literally fall under the definition of a 
hedge fund or private equity fund, such funds may pursue exactly the same strategies used by 
hedge funds and private equity funds, and those funds might not be captured by the Volcker 
Rule’s definitions. For example, commodity pools that do not mainly invest in financial 
instruments can fall into this category of funds. 
The definition’s under-inclusiveness is partly addressed by the congressional grant of authority 
to regulators to bring ‘similar funds’ within the scope of the Volcker Rule.60 To determine 
which funds should be included in the category of ‘similar funds’, regulators should analyze 
the investment activities and other features of such funds, including their compensation 
structure, trading and investment strategy, use of leverage, and investor composition.61 Indeed, 
the Investment Company Act’s statutory exemptions were not intended to exclusively apply to 
hedge funds and private equity funds. Thus, the criteria for delineating the exceptions the 
Volcker Rule intends to grant for certain funds remain to be determined by future rule making. 
The potential challenge to these definitions is that they provide excellent opportunities for legal 
engineering to circumvent them – that is, they are ripe for regulatory arbitrage.62 Likewise, 
hedge fund regulation, which relies on definitions with an appeal to the literal meaning of words 
through adjudication and judicial interpretation, can be used to undermine the very purpose of 
the regulation: to address the potential risks originating from the hedge fund industry. The 
section demonstrates that hedge fund regulation in the EU is not significantly different from 
that in U.S.; it is also over- and under-inclusive and susceptible to regulatory arbitrage. 
                                                 
59 Council, Study & Recommendations on Prohibitions on Proprietary Trading & Certain Relationships with Hedge 
Funds and Private Equity Funds  
60 Ibid 
61 Ibid 
62 McBarnet, 'Financial Engineering or Legal Engineering? Legal Work, Legal Integrity and the Banking Crisis' 
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2. The Definition of hedge funds in the EU 
The EU’s Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive (AIFMD)63 classifies hedge funds, 
along with several other funds, as ‘Alternative Investment Funds’ (AIFs). The AIFMD 
generally defines an AIF as any collective investment scheme that is not already covered by the 
regulatory regime established pursuant to the EU’s Undertakings for Collective Investments in 
Transferable Securities (UCITSs) Directive (Directive 2009/65/EC (as amended by the 
Directive 2014/91/EU). More specifically, under the AIFMD, an AIF is any collective 
investment undertaking that raises capital from a number of investors with a view to investing 
it in accordance with a defined investment policy for the benefit of those investors and that does 
not otherwise require authorization pursuant to Article 5 of the UCITS Directive, as amended.64 
As regulatory definitions are the most likely provisions used in regulatory arbitrage (e.g., 
purposely arranging the fund structure to avoid falling within the definition), the AIFMD 
attempts to address, at least in part, the issue in its definitional sections involving its scope and 
application. Thus, the AIFMD’s first line of defense against regulatory arbitrage by hedge funds 
or other investment vehicles, is embedded in its definitional sections: it does so by creating a 
very broad definition of an AIF that tries to capture all non-UCITS, to close potential loopholes, 
and to mitigate the risk of regulatory arbitrage.65  
After the AIFMD’s enactment, investment funds established in Europe are generally classified 
into two broad categories: UCITSs and AIFs. The UCITS category includes, among others, 
mutual funds and pension funds regulated under the UCITS Directive which are available to 
retail investors. Non-UCITSs or AIFs include, among others, hedge funds, private equity funds, 
and real estate funds, all of which are governed by the AIFMD. Its AIF definition , which is 
primarily intended to capture hedge funds and private equity funds, rules out many of the other 
considerations relating to the investment funds structure, such as the organizational form of a 
fund (i.e., open-ended or close-ended),66 and its legal and contractual form.67 In addition, the 
                                                 
63 Directive 2011/61/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2011 on alternative investment 
fund managers and amending Directives 2003/41/EC and 2009/65/EC and Regulations (EC) No 1060/2009 and (EU) 
No 1095/2010 (OJ L 174, 1.7.2011, pp. 1-73) 
64 Articles 4(1)(a) and 3 of the Directive 2011/61/EU. With respect to the scope, the AIFMD covers all EU managers 
managing EU and non-EU funds, non-EU managers managing EU funds, non-EU managers marketing EU or non-
EU funds in the EU. Article 2(1) of the Directive 2011/61/EU 
65 Thomas M. J. Möllers, Andreas Harrer and Thomas C. Krüger, 'The AIFM Directive and Its Regulation of Hedge 
Funds and Private Equity' (2011) 30 Journal of Law and Commerce 87 91 In addition to hedge funds directly 
regulated by the Directive, the Directive also regulates the relationship of the prime brokers and AIFMs (indirect 
regulation of hedge funds) therefore; it has implications for the business of these firms as well. 
66 In its initial draft, the AIFMD did not include the close-ended funds, while in the adopted version it covers all of 
them. See ibid                                                                                                                      
67 Recital 3 of the Directive 2011/61/EU states that many AIFM’s strategies are prone to risks in relation to inventors, 
other market participants and markets. Therefore, to provide comprehensive arrangement for supervision, the 
establishment of a framework for addressing those risks by taking into account the diverse range of AIFMs’ 
strategies and techniques is necessary. To provide such all-encompassing framework, recital 3 of the Directive 
emphasizes that the “Directive should apply to AIFMs managing all types of funds that are not covered by Directive 
2009/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 on the coordination of laws, regulations 
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AIFMD applies regardless of the nature of the fund’s investment strategies.68 Although the 
AIFMD does not differentiate between public and non-public (private) marketing,69 one UCITS 
feature that clearly distinguished a UCITS from an AIF is its source of capital: UCITSs raise 
capital from the public, whereas AIFs raise their capital privately. 70  Access to AIFs is, 
therefore, often restricted to professional investors.71  
Despite the AIFMD’s sweeping, and seemingly over-inclusive, regulation, it explicitly 
excludes: holding companies; institutions for occupational retirement provision, which are 
already covered by the EU Directive on the Activities and Supervision of Institutions for 
Occupational Retirement Provision; supranational institutions; 72  national central banks; 
national, regional, and local governments; bodies or institutions managing funds that support 
social security and pension systems; employee participation or employee savings schemes; and 
securitization special purpose entities.73  
It seems that the AIFMD’s attempt to mitigate the risks of regulatory arbitrage compromises 
the exclusiveness criterion of its definitions; by trying not to expose its provisions to regulatory 
arbitrage, the EU opted for broad and over-inclusive definitions. Not surprisingly, even before 
its implementation, the industry and many commentators criticized the AIFMD’s overbroad 
definition of an AIF.74 For example, there is considerable uncertainty as to whether certain legal 
entities and structures fall within the its scope. Such concerns are particularly pronounced 
regarding products such as covered bonds, acquisition vehicles, managed accounts, and index-
linked or performance notes.75  
A second criticism of the sweeping definitions contained in the AIFMD, is that it captures a 
broad array of dissimilar funds with highly heterogeneous investment strategies and 
indiscriminately regulates them as if they were identical. Indeed, one of the significant recurring 
concerns raised throughout the AIFMD’s legislative process was that its one-size-fits-all 
                                                 
and administrative provisions relating to the undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities 
(UCITS) (4), irrespective of the legal or contractual manner in which the AIFMs are entrusted with this 
responsibility. AIFMs should not be entitled to manage UCITS within the meaning of Directive 2009/65/EC on the 
basis of an authorisation under this Directive.” See Recital 3 of the Directive 2011/61/EU. 
68  Angus Duncan, Edmond Curtin and Marco Crosignani, 'Alternative regulation: the directive on alternative 
investment fund managers' (2011) 6 Capital Markets Law Journal 326 335 
69 Möllers, Harrer and Krüger, 'The AIFM Directive and Its Regulation of Hedge Funds and Private Equity' 
70 Duncan, Curtin and Crosignani, 'Alternative regulation: the directive on alternative investment fund managers'  
71 Unlike the pre-crisis regulatory framework, in the new regulations, there is no differential regulatory treatment of 
funds based on their marketing to different categories of investors. See Möllers, Harrer and Krüger, 'The AIFM 
Directive and Its Regulation of Hedge Funds and Private Equity' 
72 Such as “the European Central Bank, the European Investment Bank, the European Investment Fund, the European 
Development Finance Institutions and bilateral development banks, the World Bank, the International Monetary 
Fund, and other supranational institutions and similar international organisations, in the event that such institutions 
or organisations manage AIFs and in so far as those AIFs act in the public interest”. 
73 Article 2(3) of the Directive 2011/61/EU 
74 Phoebus Athanassiou, 'The AIFM Directive: An Overview of the Final Rules' (2011) 26 Journal of International 
Banking Law and Regulation 237 242 
75 Ibid 
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approach76 did not work well for all the different types and sizes of AIFs and their managers. 
Moreover, it was argued that such an approach could fail to differentiate, and draw a distinct 
line, between the different types of risk arising out of different types of funds and their 
managers.77  
Although the European Parliament ostensibly believed that the AIFMD would cover all small 
funds, it proposed a differentiated approach to regulating the industry, based on the types of 
funds rather than a uniform-but-sweeping one-size-fits-all regulatory approach.78 Nevertheless, 
despite the fact that some of the AIFMD’s provisions attempt to differentiate between large 
hedge funds and smaller ones and to draw a line between hedge funds, on the one hand, and 
private equity funds, particularly venture capital firms, on the other, the provisions ultimately 
adopted generally fail to differentiate between different types of hedge funds based on their 
investment strategies.79 For example, certain regulatory issues are more relevant to hedge funds 
and less relevant to private equity funds. To be more specific, maturity transformation, which 
may be relevant to the hedge fund industry, is not relevant to private equity funds,80 which 
implies that liquidity requirements for hedge funds should be different from those for private 
equity funds.81 Moreover, concerns about leverage in hedge funds and private equity funds are 
different: hedge fund leverage occurs at the fund level, both directly and indirectly, through 
off-balance sheet exposure (e.g., investment in derivatives), while private equity fund leverage 
often occurs at the portfolio company level.82 When regulating hedge funds, it is imperative 
that adequate attention be paid to the heterogeneity of funds, particularly hedge funds, because 
                                                 
76  Such a one-size-fits-all approach is similar to the approach followed by the Australian Commonwealth 
Corporations Act 2001in which a single licensing regime for financial products is in place which includes, among 
other alternative investment products, hedge funds. See Giorgio Tosetti Dardanelli, 'Direct or Indirect Regulation of 
Hedge Funds: A European Dilemma' (2011) European Journal of Risk Regulation 463 475 
77 Eilís Ferran, 'After the Crisis: The Regulation of Hedge Funds and Private Equity in the EU' (2011) 12 European 
Business Organization Law Review 379 398 
78 See ibid  
79 As discusses earlier, for some hedge funds proprietary information is more central than for others. The value of 
such information for hedge funds depends on what strategies they specialize in. Some hedge funds are not willing 
to disclose information even at the expense of more investments or receiving better credit terms. See Roger T. Cole, 
Greg Feldberg and David Lynch, 'Hedge Funds, Credit Risk Transfer and Financial Stability' in France Banque de 
(ed), Financial Stability Review; Special Issue, Hedge Funds (Financial Stability Review; Special Issue, Hedge 
Funds, 2007) 11 
80 Payne, 'Private Equity and Its Regulation in Europe' 
81 The AIFMD differentiates hedge funds from private equity funds and especially venture capital fund by a five-
year redemption restriction criterion. 
82 To differentiate further between private equity and hedge funds it is noteworthy to highlight that hedge funds trade 
in almost all financial instruments, assets and commodities, while private equity funds often invest in equities. In 
addition, the risk of counterparty is less in private equity compared to hedge funds. It is also argued that hedge funds’ 
trading strategies are highly correlated while the heterogeneity of assets in private equity implies that it is unlikely 
that the fire sale externalities might occur due to strategy correlations. The only systemic risk related issue that can 
occur in private equity funds rises from the input of bank debt into the portfolio company, however, the AIFMD 
does not seem to be addressing such an issue. See Payne, 'Private Equity and Its Regulation in Europe' 
Nevertheless, except under very limited circumstances, the AIFMD almost invariably treats these institutions as if 
they are identical in every aspect.  
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of their differences from similar investment companies and the need for differentiation in 
regulating such heterogeneous entities. 
In light of the above discussion, it seems that the AIFMD’s attempt to uniformly regulate AIFs 
and capture all possible contingencies largely overlooks significant differences between AIFs, 
strategies, and instruments, all of which require differentiated regulatory treatment. In other 
words, the AIFMD’s strategy for preventing regulatory arbitrage and circumvention of its 
provisions went too far. Most hedge fund managers believe that the AIFMD’s one-size-fits-all 
regulatory approach is highly inappropriate and, for at least some hedge funds, its regulations 
“simply do not make sense.”83 
With regard to systemic-stability issues, the differentiation between different-but-seemingly 
similar funds is of special significance. Regulators must devise benchmarks to differentiate and 
separate systemically important hedge funds from other funds that do not pose systemic threats 
to the financial system. For example, the Dodd-Frank Act, mentioned above, contains rules for 
identifying and regulating the potential systemic risk of private funds (including hedge funds) 
by assigning responsibility for designating entities as Systemically Important Nonbank 
Financial Companies (SINBFCs) to the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC). The 
Dodd-Frank Act grants authority to the FSOC to determine whether a non-bank financial 
company (which includes, among others, hedge funds) is to be supervised by the Federal 
Reserve (the Fed) and be subject to prudential standards. If the FSOC determines that “material 
financial distress at the U.S. nonbank financial company, or the nature, scope, size, scale, 
concentration, interconnectedness, or mix of the activities of the U.S. nonbank financial 
company, could pose a threat to the financial stability of the United States”, it will subject the 
company to the Fed’s prudential supervision.84 Furthermore, the FSOC has been given the 
discretion to recommend to the Fed that it strengthen the prudential standards for a particular 
SINBFC.85 In the EU, however, although the AIFMD introduces lower benchmarks to exclude 
smaller AIFMs from its regulatory requirements, when compared with the Dodd-Frank Act, the 
criteria for designating individual hedge funds as systemically important AIFs are blatantly 
absent.  
The EU- and the U.S.-regulatory approaches to tackling regulatory arbitrage by hedge funds 
are ill-suited for such a purpose. The remainder of this Article argues that, although all attempts 
to forestall regulatory arbitrage are flawed, the least-flawed method for tackling regulatory 
arbitrage is neither offering a negative definition nor a restrictive or over-inclusive definition; 
                                                 
83 Mats Persson, The EU's AIFM Directive: Likely Impact and Best Way Forward, , 2009) 
84 12 U.S.C. § 5323 (a)(1) 
85 Lloyd, Clancy and Kumar, Hedge Funds and Systemic Risk 
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rather, the least-flawed method involves opting for a different regulatory strategy: principles-
based regulation. After examining that regulatory strategy, the Article contends that the U.S. 
regulatory strategy, which affords regulators discretion to identify hedge funds, can be more 
effective in the fight against regulatory arbitrage arising from definitional problems. But, before 
offering regulatory strategies to fight definitional problems, the following section explains how 
hedge funds might take advantage of definitional problems to circumvent regulations and game 
regulatory regimes.  
III. Definitional problems and regulatory arbitrage 
One of the main sources of legal engineering and regulatory arbitrage is definitional problems 
in the regulation itself. 86  Regulatory arbitrage 87  essentially “exploits the gap between the 
economic substance of a transaction and its legal or regulatory treatment”.88 Such exploitation 
is made possible due to a “legal system’s intrinsically limited ability to attach formal labels that 
track the economics of transactions with sufficient precision”.89 Thus, definitional problems 
cause regulatory complications and attempts to define hedge funds for regulatory purposes are 
no exception. For years, initiatives to tighten hedge fund regulation have been thwarted by an 
inability to define them properly. 
In addition to the inherent indeterminacy in language,90 the prospective generalizations that are 
a necessary feature of law91 are yet another source of indeterminacy and vagueness in statutory 
definitions and subsequent interpretations. Regardless of how precise and determinate a 
                                                 
86 McBarnet, 'Financial Engineering or Legal Engineering? Legal Work, Legal Integrity and the Banking Crisis' 
87 Regulatory arbitrage has different sources. This Article only focuses on the regulatory arbitrage opportunities that 
arise from definitional problems. In the European Union the dynamism of regulatory competition, which can create 
ample opportunities for regulatory arbitrage in company law, is slightly different from that of the U.S. This is because 
the theory adopted in major EU jurisdictions regarding the determination of applicable laws to companies differs 
from the theory adopted in the U.S.  
There are two main contrasting theories regarding the applicable law to companies; the incorporation theory and the 
real seat theory. According to the incorporation theory, the laws of the jurisdiction in which the company is 
incorporated govern that company. In this view, the location of the business operations of the company does not 
matter. The incorporation theory is mainly adopted in the U.S. and allows for vast regulatory competition and 
regulatory arbitrage opportunities.  
In contrast, under the real seat theory, the company is subject to the laws and regulations of the jurisdiction in which 
its main business activities are being undertaken (or where the headquarter of a firm is located). This theory is 
dominant in the EU. Although most European countries opted for the real seat theory, the EU Treaty and recent 
judicial developments of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) pave the way for regulatory competition in the EU. 
Article 48 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) recognizes the right of establishment of 
undertakings. Furthermore, article 50 of the TFEU is concerned with the mutual recognition of companies. See also 
article 54 of the TFEU. See Marco Becht, Colin Mayer and Hannes F. Wagner, 'Where do firms incorporate? 
Deregulation and the cost of entry' (2008) 14 Journal of Corporate Finance 241 
Although the initial arbitrage that has taken place in the wake of those decisions came to an end, scholars still believe 
that the EU should guarantee and promote regulatory competition. See Horst Eidenmüller, 'The Transnational Law 
Market, Regulatory Competition, and Transnational Corporations' (2011) 18 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 
707. 
88 Fleischer, 'Regulatory arbitrage'  
89 Ibid 
90 Hart, The Concept of Law 
91 Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality (Oxford University Press 1979) 214 
 21 
particular rule is, the limits of human foresight implies that even the most definitive terms may 
become vague when applied to a situation that was not already contemplated when the rule was 
adopted:92 in that case, “a rule ... is only as good as its interpretation.”93 Thus, the choice of a 
particular method of interpretation in financial regulation, enforcement, and adjudication can 
significantly affect the number and severity of problems arising from the boundaries set by 
statutory definitions in financial markets.  
Limited linguistic ability, coupled with interpretation issues, breed opportunities in which 
technical compliance with the applicable rules and regulations can be achieved while 
undermining the underlying justifications on which the entire regulatory system or a specific 
law is predicated. Compliance of this sort, dubbed ‘creative compliance’, essentially involves 
“using the law to escape legal control without actually violating legal rules”,94 and is a well-
documented phenomenon.95 
Aside from the intrinsic limited ability of legal systems to capture the substance and the 
economics of transactions, another source of regulatory arbitrage is associated with ‘legal 
formalism’. Legal formalism – that is, denying the “necessity of choice in penumbral areas of 
rules”96 – follows the letter of a rule, even if it fails to serve its purpose.97 The emphasis on 
literal interpretation and legal formalism underscore the important role of definitions in 
legislation, rule-making, and adjudication. Needless to say, contrary to principles-based 
regulation, the focus of which is the ‘goals’ rather than the ‘means’ of achieving those goals, 
rules-based regulation creates vast opportunities for regulatory arbitrage.98 Likewise, rules-
based hedge fund regulation, along with the appeal to the literal meaning of words in 
adjudication and legal interpretation, can be used to undermine the very purpose of regulation 
designed to address the externalities of hedge funds. 
Accordingly, the need for interpretation implies that the regulators’ reliance on definitions is 
not necessarily helpful. On the contrary, it can be counterproductive. This impasse was the crux 
of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit decision in Goldstein v. SEC.99 
In that case, Judge Randolph said, “[t]he lack of a statutory definition of a word does not 
                                                 
92 Julia Black, Rules and Regulators (Clarendon Press 1997) 
93 Ibid 
94 D. McBarnet and C. Whelan, 'The elusive spirit of the law: Formalism and the struggle for legal control' (1991) 
54 Modern Law Review 848 848 
95 See Karen Yeung, Securing Compliance: A Principled Approach (Hart Publishing 2004) 
96 Hart, The Concept of Law 
97 McBarnet and Whelan define formalism as “a narrow approach to legal control – the use of clearly defined, highly 
administrable rules, an emphasis on uniformity, consistency and predictability, on the legal form of transactions and 
relationships and on literal interpretation.” See McBarnet and Whelan, 'The elusive spirit of the law: Formalism and 
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98 McBarnet, 'Financial Engineering or Legal Engineering? Legal Work, Legal Integrity and the Banking Crisis' 
99 See Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873, 884 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
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necessarily render the meaning of a word ambiguous, just as the presence of a definition does 
not necessarily make the meaning clear. A definition only pushes the problem back to the 
meaning of the defining terms.” 100 
Taking all the above-mentioned definitional problems into account, it is not surprising to 
observe a consistent tendency among hedge fund regulators to avoid engaging in definitional 
issues, especially issues concerning the hedge fund as an entity.101 The hassles associated with 
defining dynamic and heterogeneous entities, such as hedge funds, give rise to problems that 
make their regulation difficult, if not impossible, to implement. Indeed, the potential for 
regulatory arbitrage deters most regulatory attempts to define hedge funds and is a gigantic 
obstacle for rules-based regulation. These problems can better be addressed by using principles-
based regulation.  
IV. A policy response to regulatory arbitrage 
 The massive potential for hedge funds to practice regulatory arbitrage originates from rules-
based regulation and its inherent definitional problems. The alternative – principles-based 
regulation – is far better suited to combatting regulatory arbitrage. Principles-based regulation 
is, essentially, based on the standards-vs.-rules dichotomy in legal parlance.102 A beneficial 
aspect of ‘standards’ (as opposed to ‘rules’) is their flexibility; it allows regulated entities to 
choose the specific means of achieving the general standards and goals set by regulators, 
especially when regulation involves target and performance (or output) standards.103 Therefore, 
“in those areas of the law in which economic and social conditions change frequently and with 
them the optimal set of legal decisions, standards are more efficient than rules.”104  
                                                 
100 A statement by Judge Randolph, Circuit Judge, in Goldstein v. SEC. See Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873, 884 
(D.C. Cir. 2006). 
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102 See Louis Kaplow, 'Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis' (1992) 42 Duke Law Journal 557 
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Although the feature of the ‘rules’ that eliminates the frequently recurring and unnecessary 
debate over the issues of value and fact is the factor that favors rules vis-à-vis standards, 
“because of their ex ante character, rules will usually be over-inclusive and under-inclusive 
with reference to the arguments that justify them,”105 which is the price to be paid for the ex-
ante precision and specificity.106 Standards, on the other hand, are more durable,107 dynamic, 
and flexible, 108  and less prone to regulatory arbitrage; 109  when devising such a flexible 
approach, it is important to make use of standards rather than rules. 
Needless to say, standard setting by means of target or output standards accommodates ex-post 
trade-offs and balancing different criteria; 110  accordingly, it calls for market-participants’ 
incentives and market discipline when crafting strategies to achieve the goals set by the 
standard-setter. For this reason, the former UK Financial Services Authority (FSA)111, prior to 
the financial crisis, relied on standards rather than rules in its financial regulation under 
‘principles-based regulation’.112 
In the FSA’s view, principles-based regulation meant “moving away from dictating through 
detailed, prescriptive rules and supervisory actions how firms should operate their business.”113 
This regulatory strategy suggested “greater reliance on principles and outcome-focused, high 
level rules”, and less reliance on prescriptive rules, to achieve certain regulatory outcomes. On 
this basis, the FSA emphasized the enhancement of a risk- and evidence-based approach to 
financial regulation with an eye toward outcomes.114  
                                                 
105 Cass R. Sunstein, 'Problems with Rules' (1995) 83 California Law Review 953 1022 
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107 Isaac Ehrlich and Richard A. Posner, 'An economic analysis of legal rulemaking' (1974) 3 The Journal of Legal 
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108 Schaefer, 'Legal Rule and Standards' 
109 McBarnet, 'Financial Engineering or Legal Engineering? Legal Work, Legal Integrity and the Banking Crisis' 
110 Pierre Schlag, 'Rules and Standards' (1985) 33 UCLA Law Review 379 423 
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Authority (FCA). 
112 See Financial Services, Principles-based regulation: Focusing on the outcomes that matter 
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However, the term ‘principle’ is used by Dworkin refers generically to ‘principles’ as ‘the whole set of standards 
other than rules’. He further distinguishes between principles and policies. In its generic sense, it seems that the 
definition of principles conforms its being identical with the standards. However, in its specific sense, the standards 
per us, are policies per Dworkin, it is something beyond the scope of the thesis. For more information on this, see: 
Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Harvard University Press 1978) 22 
113 Financial Services, Principles-based regulation: Focusing on the outcomes that matter 
114 Ibid However, as FSA argues, the detailed rules will not completely be eliminated. For example, in its view, the 
detailed rules are suitable where the effect of firms’ behavior are not easily observable or only observable over a 
very long period of time, or where there is a need for consistency and standardization across an industry. For instance, 
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There were, of course, costs and benefits to the FSA’s approach. Firms benefitted from the 
flexibility of principles-based regulation and the role it may play in facilitating innovation and 
enhanced competition; the regulators benefitted from a flexible, facilitative role in innovation 
in regulatory methods and types of supervision, as well as enhanced regulatory competition. 
The FSA’s approach likely resulted in durable regulation even in a fast-changing financial 
environment. All in all, it appears that all stakeholders benefitted from the purportedly 
improved conduct of firms focused more on substantive compliance than ‘creative 
compliance’.115 
In addition to the flexibility offered by principles-based regulation with regard to variations in 
details and implementation to achieve a particular goal and the opportunities that flexibility 
affords to achieving better regulatory international harmonization and decentralization, 
principles-based regulation contains a hidden aspect – that is, it can overcome legal engineering 
that tries to comply with the words of law while escaping its reach and undermining its spirit. 
Indeed, “principles-based regulation is seen as the only realistic response, the only way to try 
to capture the spirit of the law in the face of constant creativity and technical challenge.”116 The 
need to deal with legal and financial engineering to escape the spirit of law was the driving 
force behind the adoption of principles-based regulation by the Accounting Standards Board 
(ASB) in the 1990s, “which saw it as an essential bastion against opportunistic legal 
engineering”.117 
Notwithstanding the benefits associated with the FSA’s approach, principles-based regulation 
came under criticism during the global financial crisis. Even the FSA called the approach a 
failure, partly because “a principles-based approach does not work with individuals who have 
no principles”. 118  However, after the financial crisis, scholars suggested the FSA and its 
successors not to abandon that regulatory approach merely because of crisis-driven criticism.119 
These scholars warn that reverting to a rules-based approach will likely result in even more 
legal engineering. This result is highly plausible because, “creative compliance thrives on rule-
based regulation, for tight specific rules provide particularly solid material for legal engineers 
                                                 
for the sake of easy comparability between different products, FSA may require detailed rules and define format and 
content for providing certain information. Ibid 
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to work with.”120 Adherents of principles-based regulation steadfastly continue to call for a 
renewed commitment to it, as long as it is coupled with a meaningful enforcement and 
oversight.121 
Principles-based regulation can be more effective in preventing regulatory arbitrage than rules-
based regulation. A principles-based regulator needs to rely on a functional definition rather 
than a black-letter-law definition of a hedge fun, as the latter is prone to regulatory arbitrage. 
As demonstrated earlier, neither statutory nor case-law ‘black-letter’ definitions of hedge funds 
truly capture the nature and activities of the hedge fund industry; moreover, confining the scope 
of the definition of hedge funds to a negative definition tells nothing about the hedge fund 
industry itself. With principles-based regulation of hedge funds, the identification of real-world 
hedge funds by regulators and supervisors needs to be founded on a functional approach to the 
definition of hedge funds rather than a negative statutory definition. Since the current regulatory 
definitions of hedge funds do not reflect the true nature of the industry and its attributes, the 
following section of this Article defines hedge funds not by reference to what they are not, but 
by reference to what they are, what they do, and their ‘specialness’ in the grand scheme of 
financial markets and institutions.  
V. What is a hedge fund? An alternative definition 
Hedge funds, as one of many financial-market participants, play several roles with respect to 
intermediation, risk management, and allocation of funds. Despite their status as late-comer 
investment firms, they are at the forefront of the investment industry. Interestingly, hedge 
funds, like other mainstream investment companies, are collective investment vehicles that 
manage pools of securities on behalf of their investors; from a functional standpoint, hedge 
funds can hardly be distinguished from traditional investment companies.  
From an etymological perspective, a ‘hedge’ is a mechanism designed to reduce risk. Although 
the first hedge fund was designed for hedging purposes,122 the reality of hedge funds is far 
removed from its etymological roots. In other words, the term ‘hedge fund’ does not necessarily 
imply that a particular fund is ‘hedged’ and, therefore, has limited exposure to underlying 
market risks. Indeed, it is hard to find a greater misnomer than the term ‘hedge fund’, because 
hedge funds more often speculate than hedge.123 
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To better understand hedge funds, they must be viewed in light of their similarities with, and 
differences from, other financial institutions. In general, when compared to other mainstream 
financial institutions, hedge funds are more lightly regulated. Indeed, the first, and perhaps most 
significant, distinguishing characteristic of hedge funds, which contributes to their relative 
success, is the lack of legal and regulatory restraints on their investment strategies. Therefore, 
lighter regulatory treatment of hedge funds is one of their most significant distinctive features. 
The implications of this differentiated regulatory treatment are that they cannot sell their shares 
to the general public, and their pool of investors must be limited to certain institutional investors 
and high-net-worth individuals (HNWIs). In addition, since hedge funds’ investment strategies 
and their concentration and liquidity policies are not restricted, they can engage in aggressive 
investment strategies to exploit certain short-term investment opportunities. 
The second-most conspicuous difference is the hedge funds’ organizational form and legal 
structure. Mutual funds, for example, generally use simple onshore organizational forms, 
whereas hedge funds often establish complex onshore and offshore structures. 124 A second 
unique feature is that hedge funds are typically organized in the form of either limited liability 
partnerships (LLPs) or limited liability companies (LLCs). Such legal structures, which are 
often composed of limited partners (LPs) as well as general partners (GPs), allow for 
managerial co-investment in the fund. Managerial co-investment, in turn, can obviate agency 
problems, conflicts of interests between managers and investors, and the tendency of the funds’ 
managers to engage in excessive risk taking.  
The hedge fund industry’s fee structure is a third idiosyncratic feature: it is unique in that, 
beyond the usual management fee that is charged on the overall investment in the fund, hedge 
funds often charge additional ‘performance’ or ‘incentive’ fees. While the amount of these fees 
differs, most hedge funds follow the ‘2 to 20 rule’:  they charge two percent of the investment 
in the fund as their standard management fee plus an incentive or performance fee equal to 
twenty percent of the funds’ profits.  
A fourth distinctive hedge fund feature is that they often limit their investors’ redemption rights 
and, hence, investment in hedge funds is considered to be rather illiquid when compared to the 
liquidity that banks and mutual funds offer to their depositors and investors. Moreover, hedge 
funds can limit investor redemptions in unconventional ways by using gates and side-pocket 
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arrangements125 that are thought to be essential for liquidity management. 126 Nevertheless, 
investments in hedge funds are often more liquid than investment in other AIFs, such as private 
equity and venture capital funds. 
Searching for a definition that includes all aspects of hedge funds, while simultaneously 
excluding other financial institutions seems to be a futile endeavor; there is always a need for, 
at the very least, a working definition to pass through the definitional quagmire and take further 
steps in studying them. A working ‘functional’ definition of a hedge fund is: a privately 
organized127 investment vehicle with a specific fee structure,128 that is not widely available to 
the public, 129  is aimed at generating absolute returns irrespective of market movements 
(alpha)130 through active trading,131 and makes use of a variety of trading strategies. Although 
this working ‘functional’ definition is not particularly helpful in identifying real-world hedge 
funds, the following description of the industry provides a better picture of hedge funds and 
unravels some of the myths associated with the hedge fund industry. 
VI. Are hedge funds special? 
The working ‘functional’ definition presented above must be expanded and clarified because it 
is important to understand why hedge funds are special, what makes them different, and what 
they contribute to financial systems that other financial institutions do not. In other words, a 
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true functional definition of hedge funds requires isolating hedge funds’ idiosyncratic functions 
that, if hedge funds’ did not exist, would, to a large extent, not be performed. For example, by 
law, taking deposits and granting loans are special functions performed by credit institutions 
and, in the absence of any authorized credit institutions, such functions would not be performed. 
Similarly, hedge funds perform a specific array of functions, which make them special among 
financial-market participants. 
Around three decades ago, an argument was made that, because banks were special, they 
needed special regulatory treatment. 132  Offering transaction accounts, providing backup 
liquidity for all other financial and non-financial institutions, and banks’ role as a transmission 
belt for monetary policy were three features that distinguished banks from other financial and 
non-financial institutions. Almost two decades later, after recognizing the development of close 
substitutes for banks’ services in the financial market,133 the same argument, with some slight 
variations, was repeated.134 Such an argument for banks’ ‘specialness’ presupposes that, even 
taking into account the dynamic behavior of different classes of financial institutions, the 
financial services industry is, in fact, compartmentalized;135 the argument is based on the 
underlying assumption that the nature and function of financial institutions differentiate one 
financial institution from another. Therefore, due to their specialization in certain financial 
instruments and strategies, different financial institutions yield heterogeneous benefits, become 
subject to idiosyncratic risks, and inflict disparate risks to the financial system.  
Likewise, that compartmentalization argument can be applied to support differential regulatory 
treatment for hedge funds. Such need for differential treatment can best be understood in light 
of the hedge funds’ unique functions in the financial system and their potential costs and 
benefits for the financial markets. Indeed, hedge funds occupy a relatively sui generis position 
in financial markets and provide financial systems with ‘special’ and specific benefits that other 
financial institutions, given their functions and constraints, are unable to provide.136  
Hedge funds provide diversification benefits for financial markets, 137  which means that 
investing in hedge funds can improve the risk-return relationship for investors. In addition, 
during periods of negative-equity returns, investing in hedge funds can decrease the volatility 
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of a portfolio by offsetting market movements.138 For example, allocating 10 to 20 percent of 
portfolio to alternative investments, which include hedge funds, is recommended as an ideal 
allocation of investments for pension funds that strive for a long-term low risk/low return 
investment strategy.139 
Moreover, hedge funds are also sources of liquidity.140 Their liquidity function is especially 
pronounced in niche markets and during liquidity crises.141 By investing in sub-markets that are 
“less liquid, more complex and hard-to-value,” such as convertible bonds, distressed debt, and 
credit default swaps markets, hedge funds can complete and deepen financial markets.142 In 
fact, the growth and development of some niche markets, such as unsecured and subordinated 
debt markets, in recent years is attributed to or correlated with the growth of hedge funds that 
are willing to take risks that other traditional financial firms, such as banks, are not.143  
The hedge funds’ focus on generating alpha, which comes from outperforming markets, is 
generally achieved by exploiting market imperfections and discrepancies.144 This hedge-fund 
function benefits financial markets because it facilitates and accelerates their price-discovery 
mechanism by eroding arbitrage opportunities. 145  Furthermore, legal protections for their 
proprietary information induce hedge funds to invest in the acquisition of private information, 
which is virtually exempt from disclosure requirements; that investment enables hedge funds 
to spot and exploit mispriced assets and securities, which can eventually lead to more efficient 
markets by pushing the securities prices to their true or fundamental values.146 Moreover, their 
proprietary investment in information acquisition can significantly increase the hedge funds’ 
role in disciplining underperforming firms 147  and, in some cases, uncovering fraudulent 
activities. Therefore, the larger the number and size of hedge funds, the more efficient the 
financial markets become.148 
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Due to their lighter regulation, it is somewhat easier for hedge funds to take contrarian positions 
in financial markets. Unlimited use of leverage, short selling, 149  limited investor liquidity 
(limited redemption rights or longer lock-ups), unlimited ability to invest in derivatives, and 
unrestrained investment concentration all enable hedge funds to take positions in financial 
markets that other financial institutions cannot take because of their regulatory capital 
requirements. This contrarian function of hedge funds can smooth and reduce market volatility 
as well as reduce the number and volume of asset price bubbles.150 Not surprisingly, empirical 
evidence suggests that hedge fund leverage is countercyclical to the leverage of listed financial 
intermediaries, meaning that given the pro-cyclicality of leverage in other financial institutions, 
hedge fund leverage has an inverse relationship to the leverage of other major financial market 
participants.151 In other words, when mainstream financial institutions increase their leverage 
during a financial boom, the hedge fund leverage tends to decrease, whereas in a financial bust 
or credit crunch, the mainstream financial institutions’ leverage decreases, while hedge fund 
leverage tends to increase. This hedge fund feature, coupled with their unlimited ability to 
leverage their contrarian positions, amplifies the effects of such positions. As a result, 
contrarian-position taking by hedge funds can smooth the volatility of financial markets. 
Indeed, the nature of hedge funds’ contrarian strategies enables them to be active traders during 
financial crises, which can also potentially form a price floor in distressed markets. Other 
financial institutions, such as credit institutions, cannot play that role because they are all 
subject to risk-based capital-adequacy requirements (CARs).152 Therefore, hedge funds provide 
a significant stabilizing influence by providing liquidity and spreading risk across a broad range 
of investors.153 
More importantly, the hedge fund-investor base and the mechanisms hedge funds use to lock-
up capital for longer periods allow them to sustain their contrarian positions against market 
perceptions and movements.154 Unlike mutual funds and banks, hedge funds are not obliged to 
redeem an investor’s investment on demand or even within a very short period of time. The 
right to redeem alternative investments is typically governed by private contracts that are likely 
                                                 
149 In order to take a short position, the trader usually borrows the securities from a dealer and sells them to the 
market with the expectation that price of the securities will be lower at certain point in the future at which the trader 
will again buy them back and return them to the dealer. By doing so, the short seller pockets the difference between 
higher sale price and lower purchase price at which he has bought them back and returned them to the dealer. 
150 Eechoud and others, 'Future Regulation of Hedge Funds—A Systemic Risk Perspective' 
151 This means that hedge funds can be liquidity providers in times of liquidity crunch. See Andrew Ang, Sergiy 
Gorovyy and Gregory B. van Inwegen, 'Hedge Fund Leverage' (2011) 102 Journal of Financial Economics 102 Their 
empirical study suggests that, unlike other financial institutions such as banks, hedge funds’ leverage decreased prior 
to the start of the financial crisis. 
152 Jón Daníelson and Jean-Pierre Zigrand, 'Regulating Hedge Funds' in France Banque de (ed), Financial Stability 
Review; Special Issue, Hedge Funds (Financial Stability Review; Special Issue, Hedge Funds, 2007) 30 
153 Jean-Pierre Mustier and Alain Dubois, 'Risks and Return of Banking Activities Related to Hedge Funds' (2007) 
Banque de France, Financial Stability Review; Special Issue, Hedge Funds 85 88 
154 Crockett, 'The Evolution and Regulation of Hedge Funds' 
 31 
to impose longer lock-up periods on the investors’ capital. In particular, gates and side-pocket 
arrangements within the purview of private ordering give hedge funds another tool to restrict 
investor liquidity. Freedom from liquidity constraints gives hedge funds even more tools and 
techniques to better manage their liquidity risks, enabling them to have long-term horizons in 
their investment strategies.155  
Relying, in part, on such benefits, it has been argued that, since the emergence of hedge funds 
as major-market participants, the financial markets have become more resilient in times of 
market turbulence, such as the technology or dot-com bubble burst, the 2001-2002 recession, 
the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, and the shocks caused by corporate 
scandals.156 Although the severity of the recent global financial crisis and the collapse of a 
number of hedge funds generated significant doubts about that claim, evidence suggests that 
many new hedge funds were launched to take advantage of price dislocations in securitized 
markets.157  
All in all, hedge funds can substantially contribute to “capital formation, market efficiency, 
price discovery, and liquidity”.158 Regulatory agencies have consistently acknowledged the 
benefits of hedge funds to financial system.159 Even after the financial crisis, the International 
Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) suggested that hedge funds should be 
compensated for their intermediary functions and willingness to take those risks that other 
financial market participants are unwilling (or unable) to take.160  
Not only do the hedge funds’ unique functions and benefits make them special in financial 
systems, thereby requiring special regulatory treatment, but also design-based ex-ante 
regulation of hedge funds justifies their differentiated regulatory treatment. By design, hedge 
funds have limits on the number and qualifications of their investor base. For example, investor-
base limitations in existing hedge fund regulations rule out any further need for regulation to 
protect hedge fund investors. The same cannot be said for banks, mutual funds, pension funds, 
                                                 
155 In terms of maturity transformation, hedge funds stand in between banks, mutual funds (with higher maturity 
transformation) on the one hand, and the pension funds, private equity funds and venture capital funds on the other 
hand. Despite arguments to the contrary, it seems that hedge funds play a limited role in liquidity transformation. 
See Eechoud and others, 'Future Regulation of Hedge Funds—A Systemic Risk Perspective' 
However, it is suggested that recently hedge fund are engaging more and more in liquidity transformation. Payne, 
'Private Equity and Its Regulation in Europe' 
156 Cole, Feldberg and Lynch, 'Hedge Funds, Credit Risk Transfer and Financial Stability' 
157 Lloyd, Clancy and Kumar, Hedge Funds and Systemic Risk 
158 Roach Jr, 'Hedge Fund Regulation- “What Side of the Hedges Are You on?' 
159 United States and Exchange, Implications of the Growth of Hedge Funds: Staff Report to the United States 
Securities and Exchange Commission 
160  Bianchi and Drew, 'Hedge Fund Regulation and Systemic Risk' In this perspective, the special regulatory 
treatment of hedge funds can be considered as a compensation package for hedge funds’ benefits to the financial 
system such as liquidity provision in illiquid markets, helping the price discovery mechanism to become more 
efficient, risk distribution, contribution to financial integration, and diversification benefits. 
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and insurance companies, because investors in those financial institutions are typically 
unsophisticated.  
On the other hand, a hedge fund’s choice of organizational form (LLP or LLC) automatically 
triggers certain mandatory rules relating to, among other things, the general partners’ (or 
managers’) co-investment in hedge funds and their potential liability. These features are 
intended to substantially align the fund manager’s incentives with the interests of the hedge 
fund’s investors. If not circumvented, one way or another, that organizational form 
automatically rules out the need to impose on hedge funds the types of corporate governance 
standards that are normally required for banks and mutual funds.  
To recapitulate, hedge funds provide several benefits to financial markets. They are sources of 
diversification and liquidity. By investing in “less liquid, more complex and hard-to-value” 
markets such as convertible bonds, distressed debt, and credit default swaps markets, hedge 
funds complete and deepen financial markets.161 More importantly, their  focus on generating 
alpha is rooted in exploiting market imperfections and discrepancies,162 which facilitates the 
price discovery mechanism in financial markets by eroding arbitrage opportunities. 163  In 
addition, hedge funds are considered contrarian position-takers in financial markets,164 and the 
mechanisms they use to lock-up their capital, such as investors’ limited redemption rights, 
enable them to sustain such contrarian positions.165 That function alone can potentially decrease 
market volatility and reduce the number and magnitude of asset price bubbles.166 
Focusing on these functional features of hedge funds, which constitute the definition of hedge 
funds, can help regulators to identify hedge funds and distinguish them from a variety of similar 
investment firms. Although there can be no bullet-proof definition of hedge funds that includes 
all hedge funds but excludes all similar investment funds, this definition, which focuses on 
essential features and specific functions of the hedge fund industry in the financial market, 
represents a step forward in the policy responses aimed at regulating hedge funds. It is worth 
highlighting that, if applied rigidly, this definition, in itself, will not impede regulatory arbitrage 
and other problems arising out of definitions. However, when combined with a flexible 
approach within a principles-based regulation framework, this definition may provide helpful 
guidance to regulators attempting to identify and distinguish hedge funds from similar funds. 
                                                 
161 Eechoud and others, 'Future Regulation of Hedge Funds—A Systemic Risk Perspective' See also Bianchi and 
Drew, 'Hedge Fund Regulation and Systemic Risk'  
162 In fact, the lack of legal restrictions on the use of financial instruments, strategies, and investment concentration 
of hedge funds enables them to use a wide range of techniques to exploit market imperfections. 
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Using the definition is highly likely to help optimize regulatory efforts by making them pointed 
and focused to a set of specific funds and, in turn, prevent unintended consequences and 
potential unintended disruptions in both markets and institutions due to regulatory gaps or 
overlaps stemming from ill-conceived definitions of hedge funds.   
VII. Conclusion 
This Article reviewed regulatory definitions of hedge funds in two main hedge fund 
jurisdictions. It argued that, since statutory definitions are prone to regulatory arbitrage, 
principles-based regulation, which focuses on outcomes rather than the means of achieving 
those outcomes, coupled with significant regulatory discretion, is needed to counter the gaming 
of regulatory regimes by hedge funds. This regulatory approach contrasts with the existing 
rules-based regulation approach that relies on statutory definitions and tends to tie regulators’ 
hands in dealing with regulated firms.  
It further argued that, in applying principles-based regulation, regulators need to have a clear 
understanding of the idiosyncratic attributes of hedge funds and their functions in financial 
markets. This Article represents an attempt to offer the functional definition of hedge funds 
needed for a principles-based approach, which is based not only on their organizational and 
regulatory attributes, but also on the functions they perform and the roles they play in financial 
markets. It also argued that, in order to address boundary problems and regulatory arbitrage, 
regulators should be granted the discretion necessary to designate investment funds as hedge 
funds based on their functions, investment strategies, and other essential attributes, regardless 
of a particular firm’s legal or official label. Otherwise, relying on black-letter laws or definitions 
would lead to regulatory arbitrage that would undermine hedge fund regulation. The working 
‘functional’ definition offered in this Article is intended to help regulators identify hedge funds 
and to avoid problems arising from a strictly legalistic hedge fund definition. 
